

BESTMUN'24



H-NATO STUDY GUIDE

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Letter from the Secretary-General

As the president of the Beştepe College Model United Nations Club and the Secretary General of the fourth annual edition of BESTMUN, it is my utmost honor to welcome everyone to our conference. Speaking on the behalf of the BESTMUN team as a whole, despite the many challenges we were put under, we believe we were able to present you a wonderful conference.

My name is Ebrar Nazife Korkmaz, I am a junior student at Beştepe College. I have partaken in the previous editions of BESTMUN in different positions and what was once a distant objective became reality. I am more than honored to be the Secretary General for such a prestigious conference with an academic team with enough knowledge and confidence that could conquer a nation. Model United Nations holds a special place in my heart and it always will. Since I first began in 2021, my passion has only strengthened.

Of course, such a conference wouldn't be possible without the aid of a hardworking organization team. I would like to thank my Director General and my best friend Duru Benzer for supporting me everytime and enduring untimely tasks I gave and tantrums I had throughout the preparation period. We began the thought process of BESTMUN'24 as soon as BESTMUN'23 ended and I'm glad we all share the same passion for this conference. To my deputy, Sarina Fidan, you're more than your title holds, a life saver in all periods of the conference.

The aim of this conference is to raise delegates and to provide them with a quality experience that will ensure their acceptance to future prestigious conferences. This conference will prove that Model United Nations is not an overly optimistic play-pretend, but a channel for young diplomats to pursue their goals. Indeed, it is a great way to improve yourself and learn diplomatic courtesy. I would like to thank; everyone who held my hand through the path which led to this conference, my predecessors in MUN who made today's conferences the way they are and finally, I would like to thank you for partaking in our conference. We stay united to overcome.

Kindest Regards,

Ebrar Nazife Korkmaz

Letter from the Under-Secretary-General

Esteemed Participants,


Greetings and welcome, as it is my pleasure to introduce you to the BESTMUN'24, Historical North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Committee. I am Görkem Can Coşkun, a second-year International Relations student in Social Sciences University of Ankara, and your Under-Secretary-General. My most sincere hope is to see you all as excited and thrilled as I am for our committee, and share our four days with great success.

Our task relies upon simulating NATO's response within the most realistic and planned manner, in a post-bipolar world system where tensions have lowered, and disarmament has begun. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many non-liberal systems have begun to shut down, with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia being no exception, especially after the death of Tito. While the consequences of a global power axis shift deeply affected the ever-so fragile state in the Balkans, our duty is to handle a certain part, rather extension of a wider conflict. NATO members and ambassadors must evaluate the process with extensive care, find solutions within its authority and through means of cooperation with other international organisations and agencies, as well as non-member state nations. Limited resources at one hand, with looming eyes and international reactions, NATO's stance and prestige is also of concern, even without the existence of an Eastern Bloc. Ambassadors must take into consideration all factors and act accordingly, making sure that all members work in unison and overcome any obstacles in the path. With all of the work required, a decisive and sound communique must be written at the end, including all previous operations and press releases of NATO regarding the war, and of course, the necessary solutions and precautions. Once the communique is prepared, drafted, then approved, our mission comes to an end.

Finally, I would like to share my gratitude to Bora Oğuz, our beloved Co-Under-Secretary-General, as his efforts and contribution will certainly elevate our committee's position, making sure we have a great time. Props to him, as I would not have been able to fulfil my duty to serve you all, without him. Additionally, I would like to thank Sarina Fidan for inviting me to this year to Beştepe, and offering her assistance throughout the entire process. One final thanks to Ebrar and the Secretariat for their work and endurance. If you have any questions regarding the committee or the guide, or any additional comments whatsoever, you can contact me through my e-mail: gorkemcan.coskun@student.asbu.edu.tr. Take care and hope to see you all in the conference!

Best regards,

Görkem Can COŞKUN



Letter from the Co-Under-Secretary-General

Distinguished Ambassadors,

It is an honour to serve as your Co-Under-Secretary-General in this year's BESTMUN committee of the Historical NATO. My name is Bora OĞUZ. I'm a third-year International Relations student at the Middle East Technical University. I hope you will be as delighted as I am to be a part of this year's conference.

In this guide, you will find a detailed explanation of the troubles in Kosovo. Unfortunately, ethnic issues have always plagued the Balkans. Kosovo was neither the first nor the last of these conflicts. As such, it is imperative to look at this issue from a wider perspective. We believe that you will be able to understand, and present solutions based on a higher level of understanding that we know you are capable of. This will be challenging. However, we believe you will tackle the issues while having fun and feeling accomplished.

I would like to thank the BESTMUN secretariat for giving me this opportunity to join your debates, and my fellow Co-Under-Secretary-General Görkem Can Coşkun for his hard work and support during the working process.

Lastly, please do not be afraid to contact me via my e-mail address, bora.oguz@metu.edu.tr, for any questions you might have.

My Kindest Regards,

Bora OĞUZ

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1. Introduction

1.1. Introduction to H-NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an intergovernmental alliance formed as a necessity of regional security and defence in Europe after the Second World War, in April 1949. Although currently altered, NATO's main purpose was to deter eastern aggression as a bipolar system had developed between the United States and the Soviet Union, threatening the integrity and future of an already ruined Europe, and ultimately the world. Within NATO, every member state contributes to a collective security system through different methods, including but not limited to allocating a certain budget to the alliance, integrating NATO's commanding structure and mechanisms, conducting joint programs and research in order to develop further assets, and more, thus allowing member states to progressively advance in terms of defensive capabilities and technological developments.

Originally, the treaty was made between twelve (12) original members, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Eventually, it expanded in 1952 with Greece and Turkey, in 1955 with West Germany, and in 1982 with Spain. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO took on a more passive yet firm stance, with more regional roles extending to Africa and the Middle East. Furthermore, the administrations of Bush and Clinton made several attempts and considerations to expand their influence towards Eastern Europe, as the Russian Federation retained what remained of the ill-fated Soviet influence. Although opposed by the latter, NATO successfully integrated the Visegrád Group in March 1999, after multiple summits, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in the alliance as member states.

As our committee is a historical one, events occurring in the 21st century are not within our spectrum, as we shall solely focus on our agenda item which takes place in 1999, and for the same reason, NATO members which have joined after March 1999 (after the Visegrád Group) are not going to be available within the committee.

1.2. Introduction to the Agenda Item: Kosovo War 99'

Starting on 28 February 1998, the Kosovo War of 1999 surfaced as a result of undergoing ethnic tensions since the death of Josip Broz Tito. Majority of Kosovo's inhabitants being ethnic Albanians, decided to oppose Serbian discrimination as constant political repressions were put on the region. With the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, or UÇK), in the early 1990s, rebellions resurfaced after several protests in the 1980s. Following the Yugoslavian Wars, Kosovo could not achieve their goal of bringing its cause to the international agenda through the Dayton Agreement, therefore deciding to undertake loud and violent actions against Serbian forces in the province. Obtaining arms from Albania, KLA intensified the strength of their operations, resulting in an increase of active Serbian military personnel in Kosovo, entering an endless cycle of conflict, which resulted in thousands losing their lives, and thousands more getting displaced.

Following the campaign conducted by Yugoslavian forces aiming to expulse Kosovars from Kosovo after the withdrawal of the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Kosovo Verification Mission, which aimed to deter any aggressive Serbian actions against the population in the region, NATO decided to step in with aerial operations on 24 March 1999, under the name of a "Humanitarian War". The operation ended in June of the

same year, resulting in the Kumanovo Agreement, with Yugoslavian forces withdrawing from Kosovo.

Participants of H-NATO are tasked with representing the organisation and its stance towards the conflict with careful consideration, planning and appropriate reactions, as well as deciding upon the right time to intervene, and how to do so. The committee will begin on 23 February 1998. While the operation's success is crucial, an all-out strike is never the right answer, as minimizing civilian casualties and damage is key. All ambassadors must act accordingly and correspondingly with their national stances. At all times, participants / ambassadors must also be prepared for immediate actions against emergencies and crises. Working in unison is vital for the conclusion of the committee, which is to end the hostilities in Kosovo, reach an agreement between the two parties, and secure the population for the last time. The international community shall closely monitor the actions of the pact throughout the whole campaign, affecting credibility.

2. Background Analysis

2.1. Ottoman Rule Until the Nation States Period

With the ethnic nature of the conflicts in Kosovo, it is important to understand the region's history. As the claimants for any region often do, in Kosovo, too, we see appeals to the area's historical importance. Depending on the perspective, these can be understood as simple irredentism or legitimate claims for the area. However, it is essential to learn the historical material basis of the conflict

Before the Ottoman annexation, Kosovo gained its importance as the centre of the medieval Serbian empire (Sterio, 2010). The period of this empire's existence, by the majority of Serbians, is considered the golden age of the golden age of Serbian nation, and Kosovo is considered the cradle of their civilization (Tütsch, 2005). As such, anything related to the medieval Serbian empire and Kosovo holds immense symbolic value for the Serbians as a basis for their national history and civilization.

Under Ottoman rule, the ethnoreligious structure of the Kosovar population changed due to some factors. Ottoman religious favouritism and the Timar system were the most critical factors in the early changes in the area's demographics (Malcolm, 2020). The Timar system was the medieval Ottoman strategy somewhat resembling feudal Europe, in which Timar holders were assigned management, not ownership, over land to administer and provide troops if deemed necessary. Especially in newly conquered territory, this system also had the intended effect of not necessarily "Turkifying" but Muslimising the territory. Coupled with the overall better treatment of Albanians due to a significant portion converting to Islam, Albanians started to thrive compared to the Orthodox Serbians, including in Kosovo (Vickers, 1998). This resulted in a change in favour of Albanians in Kosovo. Nevertheless, Serbs still constituted the majority.

The 1689 uprisings in support of the invading Habsburg army seem to be the significant event that toppled the Serbian majority in Kosovo. While differing scholars present vastly different historical accounts, each according to what can be called their respective "Nation-State Mythos", consensus seems to be that an uncertain number of both Albanians, especially Catholics, and Serbians rose against the Ottoman rule but later on somewhat reverted to the Ottoman side due to excessive mistreatment under the Habsburg army (Malcolm, 2020).

However, with the retreating Habsburg army, a significant number of Kosovar Serbs migrated towards Hungary, resulting in the Kosovar majority being Albanian following this event (Malcolm, 2020).

2.2. Nationalism, Independent Serbia, London Conference, Independent Albania

The establishment of the Albanian majority in the area was followed by a relatively peaceful and stable period until the Nationalist fervour after the French Revolution. The problems in the Balkans quickly started to show as many new nation-states claimed vast swathes of land at the expense of their rivals. As mentioned before, oftentimes, these claims were nothing more than irredentist claims based on nationalist foundational myths. In the case of Kosovo, it was a mix of both. While the Serbian claim was largely based on Kosovo's historical importance, it still had a sizeable Serbian minority (Tütsch, 2005). Albanian claims lied more so in their actual material condition, being the majority in Kosovo.

Initially, the ethnic conflict between Albanians and Serbians did not start in Kosovo. The first significant conflict was the forced migration of Muslim Albanians living in Nis (Frantz, 2009). This forced migration was following the independence of Serbians from Ottoman rule. Serbian nation-state was formed, although without Kosovo, which they considered essential close to the level of Mecca for Muslims. These migrants later went on to settle in Kosovo and take revenge on the Serbian minority there (Vickers, 1998). This started a cycle of violence and conflict.

During this period, Albanian national identity also advanced. It took longer than Serbians, partly because of the Muslim identity of the Albanians and partly because of their separation into four administrative sancaks by the Ottoman government (Perritt, 2010). However, when the movement started to gain momentum, with the leadership of Albanian deputies in the Ottoman parliament, it ended up with Kosovo as its centre (Malcolm, 2020).

After some uprisings, some of which were supported by the new Serbian State, Albanians gained their, firstly, de-facto and afterwards de-jure independence. However, it was an incredibly harsh process for all the states involved.

2.3. London Conference of 1912-1913, London Treaty, and Balkan Wars

The First Balkan War was one of the most important events that shaped the future of Kosovo. Ottomans lost the war in humiliation, and the Balkan League, which Serbia was a part of, emerged as the triumphant party. In this war, some Albanians, due to perceiving a Serbian threat to their existence in the case of an Ottoman collapse, sided with the Ottomans, which resulted in an unfortunate position in the post-war talks (Vickers, 1998).

After the armistice was signed, The London Conference started. As well as deciding how the former Ottoman land would be split, the conference also discussed the future of Albania on the world scene (Vickers, 1998). The Albanians brought their argument for their right to an Albanian homeland in the areas that constituted an Albanian majority. However, their previous position and the Serbian claims on Kosovo made achieving it challenging. Great Power diplomacy resulted in many compromises, and Austria-Hungary, who supported the

Albanian side, chose to compromise the position of Albanians in favour of the Russian-backed Serbians (Vickers, 1998). In this environment, the Treaty of London was signed. This resulted in the new Independent Albania being confined to the centre parts of Albania and Kosovo being on Serbian soil. Even then, Serbians and Greeks were dissatisfied with the establishment of an Albanian state, preferring a partition of the limited land it was granted to be partitioned between the two states (Vickers, 1998). This can be considered one of the reasons, albeit as complementary to much bigger ones, for the Second Balkan War. Some parts of the Treaty were not honoured by the Serbians due to dissatisfaction with not being able to gain territory in Northern Albania, which made a war with Bulgaria inevitable (Vickers, 1998). Nevertheless, the Second Balkan War did not change the fate of the Kosovars aside from changes in alliances and power levels of Balkan actors, as it was won by the Serbians and their allies over the Bulgarians. As such, for the purposes of this guide, we will not be going to detail the Second Balkan War here.

In this era, around fifty thousand Albanians were killed by regular armies and irregulars alike in Kosovo (Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade, n.d.).

2.4. Serbian Rule and WW1

The aforementioned importance given to Kosovo by Serbians resulted in efforts of Serbification efforts in Kosovo (Tütsch, 2005). These, however, were more subtle in the pre-Great War era. At the start of the Great War, Albanians first welcomed the war, seeing the declaration of war of Austria-Hungary on Serbia as an opportunity (Vickers, 1998). During the war, Kosovo was in a bloodshed. Albanian and Serbian populations in Kosovo entered a vicious war with atrocities committed by both sides (Vickers, 1998). With the invading Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, the Serbian State eventually lost control of Serbia, including

Kosovo, and had to retreat using the Northern Albanian Mountains. This gruesome plight saw around a hundred Serbs die, mostly from harsh environments and conditions, with Albanians refraining from attacking the retreating Serbs overall.

In the occupied Kosovo, two differing realities were present, an incredibly harsh Bulgarian persecution and Austria-Hungarian uplifting of the Albanians to counter Serbian influence. Austria-Hungary even went as far as to open around three hundred Albanian language schools in Kosovo (Vickers, 1998). Bulgarians, however, persecuted Serbs and Albanians alike in horrifying conditions.

During this time, in a secret Pact of London of 26 April 1915 that Bolsheviks later on revealed, the Allies promised the Albanian land to Italy and Greece to convince Italy to join the war (Vickers, 1998).

Again, simultaneously, Serbs attributed some religious and nationalist atrocities, such as the desecration of Orthodox Churches, to the Albanians (Vickers, 1998). Albanians had no connection to those crimes. When the tide of the war turned and it ended, the irregularly armed Serbs and then the Serbian army reentered Serbia and, with it, Kosovo. From then on, many atrocities were committed against the Albanian population not just in Kosovo but in other areas in Serbia which resulted in many refugees fleeing for Independent Albania (Vickers, 1998).

In the peace treaties that followed, Independent Albania further lost territory as well as entered into the Italian Mandate (Vickers, 1998). Furthermore, Yugoslavia, then named the

Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, was formed, a constitutional monarchy largely dominated by the Serbians.

2.5. Kingdom of Yugoslavia, WW2

In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, anything related to the Albanian culture, schools and centres were immediately closed. With the Serbian popularity in Allied countries, the problems were mainly ignored as the Serbians argued for the necessity of Kosovo for their cultural identity (Vickers, 1998). After a while, the plight of Kosovar Albanians to join Albania were heard but resulted in no change, with the tensions between Albanian and Yugoslav governments easing very slightly.

In this era the Kachak Movement started, which was predominantly made of Kosovar refugees. Their strategy was primarily based on raids against Yugoslavia. They quickly became popular in and outside of Albania, resulting in an even increased distrust of Albanians in Yugoslavia (Vickers, 1998). The movement also had opponents in Albanian government positions who made great efforts to disarm and abolish the movement. In retaliation, the movement's prominent leaders tried to overthrow the government but failed. At times betrayal of Kachaks against Yugoslavia happened, which lowered the tension between the two governments. A more liberal Yugoslavian government in 1924, issued amnesty for former Kachaks as well, which at the end practically ended the movement, with Kosovar Albanians accepting their position as persecuted minorities in their new kingdom (Vickers, 1998).

During this period, Serbification efforts continued with two colonial programmes. In the first part, assimilation, dispossession, and settlement were the main focus. The goal was to assimilate Albanians through bans on their language and culture. Dispossessions were not

only aimed to provide land for Serbian settlers but also to provide the grounds necessary for deportations in the second programme. Several tactics were used to dispossess Albanian land. As a traditional society with communal use of land, Kosovar Albanians often did not have any legal documents to count for their ownership (Vickers, 1998). Albanians, furthermore, were promised compensation in the form of new land, but what they were given was almost always far less fertile.

In the second programme, these efforts were complimented by a deportation policy. Turkey was contacted, and a deal was made for Turkey to take in two hundred thousand Albanians (Vickers, 1988). Eventually, this programme failed due to its costly execution and rising tensions in Europe and no more Albanian deportations to Turkey were made.

Eventually, these tensions manifested in the World War 2. World War 2 symbolised a weird era for Albanians, especially in Kosovo. By 1941, both Yugoslavia and Albania fell under the occupation of the Axis forces. Kosovo was split between direct German control and Bulgarian occupation, and the largest part was attached to the Italian-occupied satellite Kingdom of Albania (Bebler, 2015). Harsh Serbian rule over Kosovo resulted in the invading Germans and Italians being seen as liberators (Bebler, 2015)

Several changes immediately put the Albanians in an advantageous position. Firstly, far greater rights were given to the Kosovar Albanians for self-determination (Tütsch, 2005). These included the freedom to fly the Albanian flag, reopening Albanian schools, and the formation of an Albanian Gendarmerie (Vickers, 1988). Furthermore, Most Kosovar Albanians shared with the Axis powers that Serbians were an internal threat (Vickers, 1988).

What followed was a persecution of Serbians this time. The persecution, however, followed an interesting pattern. Serbians were arrested, deported to forced labour camps, and killed (Vickers, 1998). However, only the aforementioned settlers were attacked, granting practical immunity to the native Kosovar Slavs (Vickers, 1998).

Both in Albania and Yugoslavia, the main opposition to the occupation came from communists, who were working in tandem for this duration. Very few Kosovar Albanians joined this resistance initially and preferred nationalist organizations. With the encouragement of the Allies against the wishes of the Yugoslavian Communist Party, a short-lived Mukje Agreement between these organizations was achieved. However, immediately after this agreement, Tito and the Yugoslavian Communist Party changed their position on Kosovo from unity with post-war Albania to a self-determining nation retained within Yugoslavia (Vickers, 1998). This, in turn, resulted in the Mukje Agreement being annulled in less than a year after its formation.

Yugoslavians justified this move in a few ways. Firstly, communist Yugoslavia would be for all the nations that constituted it; secondly, it was integral for Kosovo to not secede in order to win over the Serbians to communism; lastly, a possibility of an eventual greater Albanian inclusion as an autonomous federal entity to Yugoslavia and even unified communist Balkans was hoped for (Vickers, 1998).

Close to the end of the War, the Bujan Conference was held between Albanian and Yugoslav communists and Kosovar Albanians. In this conference, a unity message was again given to the Kosovar Albanians, and Yugoslav communists blamed the pre-war Yugoslav government for the ethnic conflict in Kosovo (Vickers, 1998).

However, Albanian SS collaborators still ran havoc during this period, especially in the spring of 1944, continuing the killing of Serbians and Montenegrins indiscriminately as well as deporting Slavs and replacing them with Albanian settlers in Kosovo (Vickers, 1998).

In the end, Kosovo was captured by the Yugoslav communists. This resulted in a confused Kosovar population that could not understand why the previous agreements could not be fulfilled, and as such, both Serbian and Albanian Kosovars felt betrayed and considered both Yugoslav and Albanian communist armies enemies (Vickers, 1998). An Albanian Uprising followed this confusion, which itself had unclear goals and political orientation. Eventually, this uprising was suppressed by Yugoslavians, who considered many who joined this uprising to be Nazi collaborators and dealt with them in this fashion.

2.6. Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Tito, Pristina University Riots

It was decided after these events that Kosovo would be a part of Federal Serbia as an autonomous constituent (Vickers, 1998). This was followed by a period of concessions to the Kosova Albanians to win them over to the communist cause, which included the prohibition of Serbian settlers who ran away during the war from going back to their villages and the open border policy towards Albania (Vickers, 1998). As can be seen from this, however, the injustice cycle did not end with now Serbians being offended.

Moreover, the first constitution of the new Yugoslavia had fundamental flaws. The autonomy level difference between Vojvodina and Kosovo offended Albanians, and on a greater scale,

the national question of Albanians was ignored. Albanian-speaking areas were chosen arbitrarily, and they were divided administratively. Furthermore, Kosovar's rights were based on the Republic of Serbia's constitution, which was an attempt to please Serbian nationalism (Vickers, 1988).

Due to these, the Albanian Kosovars remained hostile to the regime and faced widespread persecution and killings due to alleged reactionary actions. This situation worsened after the Tito-Stalin split and naturally following the Tito-Hoxha split. Some of the earlier concessions given to the Albanians were reverted, and the borders were closed again (Vickers, 1998). Albanians were encouraged and even forced to identify as Turks in a Turkification policy resemblant to the old Yugoslavian colonial programmes.

However, simultaneous social improvements were also being made in Kosovo. Mostly illiterate Albanian Kosovars were finally going to schools in their own language, Albanian language newspapers were being produced, the status of women in the society was improving, and overall, the cultural horizon of the Kosovars was widening (Vickers, 1998). These two simultaneous realities resulted in a confusing reality for the Albanians. Moreover, similar to the repression of Albanian culture, Serbian culture and identity too were being repressed, albeit on a smaller scale and less harshly, with a Yugoslavian identity being favoured (Vickers, 1998).

The 63 constitution provided very little positive change. It lowered the position of both Vojvodina and Kosovo but also equalized their level. The real changes started with the purge of Rankovic, the Vice President of Yugoslavia, and his cadres. Rankovic was an avid proponent of Serbo-centralism, which was one of the leading causes of the injustices in

Kosovo. With him gone, most of the persecution ended, such as the Turkification policy and secret polices (Vickers, 1998). Most of the non-Serbian population of Yugoslavia celebrated this purge, and it opened up the possibility of immensely increased Kosovar autonomy and self-determination.

However, with this newly acquired freedom and subsequent celebration of Albanian culture came accusations of irredentism, which resulted in no actual improvement in autonomy for a while (Vickers, 1998). Frustrated Albanian Kosovars took to the streets in a riot in 1968, which, while placed under control, prompted significant political changes. In the same year, constitutional amendments came that allowed Kosovo and Vojvodina to have their constitutions. Serbian name Metohija was removed from Kosovo's official name, and socialist was added to the front. In 1969, the Serbian Parliament adopted a new constitution for Kosovo, and with it, Kosovo's judicial and legislative autonomy rose significantly.

These improvements for Albanians in Kosovo meant a deterioration in the conditions of the Kosovar Slavs. Many Serbians and other Slavs started to leave the region following these reforms and this trend continued in the future (Vickers, 1998).

The most important change happened with the constitution of 74. The Constitution was directed at increasing local autonomy and reducing the federal power. With this constitution, Kosovo and other autonomous communities became practically as powerful and influential as republics in Yugoslavia, making them de-facto republics aside from symbolic formalities (Vickers, 1998). Going forward, Kosovo had access to a veto right in matters related to Kosovo, and they were directly included in every level of government.

Nevertheless, this constitution still had problems for all sides. Firstly, Albanians were adamant in the Kosovar ascendance to the republic level, and their classification of nationality rather than nation barred the Kosovars from seceding (Vickers, 1998). For the Serbians, this meant their importance and rights dwindling. They were also unhappy that the ethnic majority Serbian Vojvodina was autonomous based on historical and cultural importance, while these principles were disregarded in Kosovo's autonomy based on purely ethnic composition (Vickers, 1998). The Serbians had correct points; Kosovar life was becoming increasingly Albanianised which made it increasingly difficult for Serbian Kosovars to live their life. As Albanians thrived, Serbians were reverting to being minorities stripped of their rights. During this period, Kosovo's administration ran with close to none outside interference (Vickers, 1998). Another problem was that, despite social improvements, virtually no progress was being made regarding the dire economic situation that Kosovo was in.

By 1978, demand for the Kosovar Republic rose again. Tensions started rising in schools and universities over nationalism. A further mistake was made, encouraging a large number of young people to study in Kosovo in an effort to hide increasingly high unemployment rates. Furthermore, economic development continuously could not be achieved, which widened the gap between Kosovo and Yugoslav Republics, increasing frustration and ethnic conflict in a highly competitive labour market. This inequality also bothered the Yugoslavian Republics, who saw the investments made in Kosovo as excessive and unnecessary due to no progress being made (Vickers, 1998). As Yugoslavia as a whole was getting poorer, it seemed increasingly evident that the Market-Socialist experiment was failing.

In 1980, Tito died. Tito was the figure that made Yugoslavia possible, and with his death ended the notion of brotherhood, unity, and liberation in Yugoslavia. Kosovo was one of the

places where his death was collectively mourned. Kosovars felt like they had lost their protector (Vickers, 1998). With many problems of personal, ethnic, and cultural dilemmas in Yugoslavia, his death meant uncertainty, as he had no designated successor. The economic problems were still ongoing, as the migrating Slavs represented skilled or semi-skilled portions of the Kosovar workers (Vickers, 1998). Furthermore, while Albanian Kosovars believed that their economic freedom was a precondition to their sociopolitical stability, only one in ten was a waged worker. Moreover, out of these wage earners, the highest share of the fund was allocated to the swiftly expanding bureaucratic class, which was both a drain and a cause of inequality (Vickers, 1998).

Just a few months after Tito's death, the Kosovar riots of 1981 shook Yugoslavia. The riots started as a student protest due to food and housing conditions at the University of Pristina. Due to the previous encouragements, the University was operating at a much higher capacity than it was built for (Vickers, 1998). However, the protest was quickly joined by other young people. Security police outside the University could only briefly control the situation, and the dispersed groups restarted rioting about two weeks later (Vickers, 1998).

This time, the riots were much more violent. The Serbian and Montenegrin citizens of Kosovo were beaten, and their homes and businesses were burned and looted (Vickers, 1998). The culturally important Serbian Pec Patriarchate was partially burned. With the violence rising, the scope of the riots widened. Now, other towns of Kosovo were joining the riots, asking for unification with Albania or Republic status and even chanting "Long Live Enver Hoxha" (Vickers, 1998). Workers joined these riots as well at which point the life in Kosovo came to a halt. Excessive force was used by the new and precarious post-Tito leadership, but these attempts to control the situation were seen as occupation attempts by Albanian Kosovars. In Yugoslavia, the University was much criticized, both as an ineffective form of higher

education causing unemployment and apathy in Kosovo and as a hotbed of Albanian nationalism and irredentism, and this resulted in the University being temporarily closed (Vickers, 1998). Moreover, Yugoslavians were unhappy with how much misinformation they had been fed. The government first tried to paint the picture of rogue traitors condemned by the local Albanians but failed as the local support became more evident (Vickers, 1998).

The position of Albanians in Tirana was also somewhat complicated. While they did not actively participate in or effect the riots, they did try to paint a romantic picture of Albania in Kosovo and strengthen ties. The general consensus was that now with Tito dead, the fall of Yugoslavia was imminent but unpreferable (Vickers, 1998). They feared a Soviet intervention in an unstable Yugoslavia that could be followed by one to Tirana. Also, they were not particularly fond of the religious freedom Kosovars had and their excessive nationalism.

These still did not keep Yugoslavia from shifting the blame to the government in Tirana. The riots created a dichotomy within Albanian Kosovars of nationalism or sympathy towards Yugoslavia (Vickers, 1998). Swift persecution and imprisonment of the rioters followed. Moreover, Serbian Kosovars started to organize both to be prepared for more ethnic violence and to petition about their condition in Kosovo. Furthermore, as the riot spread outside of Kosovo to other Albanian-speaking communities, the riots had the effect of reviving Serbian, Macedonian, and Montenegrin nationalism. Any progress made towards a unified Yugoslav identity was erased and people increasingly identified with their nation (Vickers, 1998). Especially Serbians, whose status of having major populations outside of their jurisdiction in Yugoslavia resulted in them supporting a strong Yugoslavia, felt betrayed and disempowered. Now, the Kosovar leadership had the hard question of how they could combat Albanian nationalism without alienizing an already radicalized portion of Albanian youth. Nevertheless, the riots showed that the fall of Yugoslavia was imminent.

2.7. Further Unrest, Serbian Situation, and Rise of Milošević

The situation going forward is perfectly captured in the events surrounding Rankovic's funeral. On 20 August 1983, tens of thousands of Serbs attended the funeral of the infamous Alexander Rankovic, in what can be considered the first Serbian mass protest concerning the situation of Serbs in Yugoslavia (Vickers, 1998). Most Serbs felt that after Tito, there was no interest in protecting Serbian rights in Yugoslavia.

One of the most pressing issues was still the Serbian and Montenegrin migration from Kosovo. By this point, a systematic maltreatment of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo. Due to the language laws, nationalistic preferences in hiring processes, and an overall inability to self-express and self-determine, Serbs in Kosovo saw no future in Kosovo (Vickers, 1998). The Kosovo government could not solve this issue.

During this time, more Serbian protests continued to be organized. One significant event was the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, denouncing the 74 constitution and calling a reduction in Kosovo's autonomy, calling for a demographic shift in favour of Serbs and Montenegrins through resettlement, and overall siding with the Serbian plight (Vickers, 1998). Inspired by this Memorandum, another colonisation project called the Yugoslav Programme started, in which around ten thousand Serbs were settled in Kosovo with guaranteed high-paid jobs (Vickers, 1998).

Furthermore, still following the Marxist-Leninist principle that such ethnic conflicts were the results of economic injustice, more funds were allocated to develop Kosovo (Vickers, 1998). But the province still lagged in development, with unemployment further rising.

These problems culminated in further unrest and crime, most prominently arms smuggling. Many Albanians were smuggling arms into Kosovo. The tensions also spread to a broader area, mainly in diaspora communities of Western Europe. Terrorist attacks between these communities, also tied to arms smuggling, were being carried out (Vickers, 1998). Even a drug lab for producing heroin was built in Pristina. Amidst this situation, the Yugoslavian forces and riot police were deployed both around and in Kosovo.

During this time, the rise of Milošević started. As one of the two most prominent Serbian politicians, he was a highly nationalist and conservative figure. He increased his popularity by visiting Kosovo and giving speeches there. Furthermore, he used this popularity to further the Serbian political goals and one of his most important achievements is that he convinced the collective Yugoslavian leadership to consider the conflict from a purely ethnic perspective (Vickers, 1998). Another significant achievement of his was the eventual pushback on the autonomous status of Kosovo through constitutional changes in Serbia. Around this time, he also rose to be the leader of the League of Communists of Serbia, winning over his more liberal rival (Vickers, 1998).

3. Yugoslavian Wars

3.1. Milošević & New Yugoslavia

As Slobodan Milošević continued consolidating his power over Serbia, tensions within Yugoslavia rapidly increased. The state's decision to reduce and effectively cease Kosovar autonomy and directly put themselves at the helm of the ship with the Serbian People's Assembly's decision on March 28, 1989, fuelled the already unravelling unrest in the region.

Violence and political repression followed as The Provincial Assembly of Kosovo was disbanded by the Serbian Assembly on July 5, 1990. The dissolution was accompanied by police intimidation, brutality and numerous arrests by the Yugoslavian People's Army (JNA) in the streets of Pristina. Kosovar Albanian deputies were detained, and Kosovo's already suffering and subjugated population witnessed yet another outright discrimination and harsh treatment by the Serbian police and courts. Without any doubt, due to the government's unilateral actions, Serbia single-handedly undermined the structural integrity of Yugoslavia and the constitutional order, putting forward a great-scale threat towards other republics in the federation. It reaffirmed the already existing fears of Croatia and Slovenia, that Serbian leadership within Yugoslavia, aligned and supported by the federal military, without opposition, would consequently attempt similar actions in other parts of the nation. The repression and anti-Albanian movements deeply scarred contemporary relations with Croatia and Slovenia, contributing to the already boiling internal crisis. (Bebler, 2015).

Troubles brewing at home, the geopolitical situation had been dramatically changing worldwide since the mid-1980s, most importantly with radical shifts of balance in Europe, specifically the East. Naturally, the communist Yugoslavian regime could not withstand the accelerated change of global order all alone, under existing circumstances. The crisis in Kosovo was followed by cracks caused by years of distrust in the government finally surfacing with Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia stepping up against Serbia.

3.2. Breakaways

Officially declaring independence; Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia had finally broken away from Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Slovenia fought against the Yugoslavian forces during the Ten-Day War, avoiding a full-scale invasion and gaining their freedom.

Croatia on the other hand had more difficulty achieving their goal, battling the Serbians in the field until a ceasefire in 1992 and briefly in 1995, in unison with Bosnia and Herzegovina, who also went through a devastating process. The wars resulted in thousands of displaced people and refugees with new borders drawn. Economies were shattered, with completely decimated infrastructure. Macedonia earned their independence through a referendum and was mostly at peace throughout the Yugoslavian Wars. Balkanized, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved in 1992. The remaining lands reformed into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of only Montenegro and Serbia with Vojvodina and Kosovo being regions/provinces of the latter.

Kosovo's situation was unique in contrast with other republics, due to its autonomous status, or rather revoked autonomy. Despite attempts to break free, including both passive and violent protests as mentioned in titles above, as well as paramilitary groups forming, they have been unable to reach their goal. During the late 1990s however, the situation began to change in favour of Kosovo, even though a lot of suppression and gore took place. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was already quite fragile as well as unstable and with continuous mismanagement including provocation against non-Serbian ethnicities, tensions peaked with a new insurgency taking arms, namely the Kosovo Liberation Army, or KLA (UÇK) for short.

Additionally, with external (only political) support from Albania, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo had decided to declare total independence from Yugoslavia. They held an unofficial referendum in September 1991, in which they overwhelmingly voted in favour (Klip, 2001).

3.3. First Republic of Kosovo & Albanian Recognition

On October 22, 1991, the First Republic of Kosovo, a self-declared independent proto-state, was immediately recognised by the People's Assembly of Albania following a unilateral statement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

“Without any attempt to dwell upon other parts of the information submitted by Albania, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia underlines the political significance of the statements contained therein and expects that consequently Albania shall revoke, as a matter of urgency, the decision of the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania of 22 October 1991, enclosed herewith (see annex), on the recognition of the Province of Kosovo and Metohija, an integral part of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as a sovereign and independent state.

Annex: The People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania recognizes the Republic of Kosova as a sovereign and independent state, on the basis of freedom and complete equality with all other peoples. It also recognizes as legitimate the new provisional government of the Republic of Kosova under the direction of Dr. Bujar Bukushi. It appeals to democratic international opinion and the member countries of the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to recognise and observe the legitimate will of the Albanian people of Kosova. This would be another proof of their sincere engagement and without prejudice to a correct resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.” (Krieger, 2001)

Although it may seem successful, it would be optimistic to say it was. Neither the declaration of independence nor the statement of recognition elevated the situation in favour of Kosovo, as Yugoslavia's political status quo did not alter regarding the structure. However, it did fuel

further rebellious movements in the upcoming years, as neighbouring states began fulfilling their goals.

In May 1992, Albanians organised their own presidential and parliamentary elections, and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) won an overwhelming majority of 76.44%. As a result, its leader, Ibrahim Rugova, became the President of Kosovo. Furthermore, to this development, Kosovar Albanians began building a 'parallel society', establishing their own 'tax' system, to which not only local Albanians but also diaspora communities in Western Europe contributed. Kosovar Albanians were thus very well mobilised and organised under the leadership of the LDK by the end of 1992.

This situation did not lead to violent conflict in Kosovo, because the LDK adopted non-violent strategies and did not choose to organise armed rebellions. Even when the Croatians and later Bosnian Muslims encouraged Albanians to take up arms and open the 'southern front' against Serbia during the Yugoslavian Wars, Albanian leaders rejected their requests, due to several factors; and due to these factors, the non-violent movements led by the LDK were predominant among Albanians until the UÇK started moving the opposite way in contrast with the LDK, in 1996 (Kubo, 2010).

3.4. Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UÇK)

Internally, Kosovo has had always been problematic since the foundation of the new Yugoslavia. Ongoing political and social harassment could not be just stopped with passive protests. In the case of Kosovo, various factors often cited as causes of violent conflict in the literature cannot fully explain the occurrence of ethnic rebellion. For instance, the high level of grievances, caused by the discriminatory policies and annulment of the autonomy, did

motivate Kosovar Albanians to seek secession from Serbia but did not necessarily motivate them to take up arms immediately, as shown. The political regime in Serbia remained strong and authoritarian, and there was no 'political instability' at the centre which could have motivated the potential rebels to take up arms. The economic situation in Kosovo, the geographic concentration of the Albanians and the mountainous terrain may provide a partial explanation of the occurrence of ethnic rebellion in Kosovo, but these factors had been present for a long time before the onset of rebellion by the UÇK in 1996, and thus they cannot explain why the Albanians did not choose rebellion in the early 1990s while some Albanians started to rebel in 1996.

Over time, the embracement of foreign ideology and merging it with regional fervour as well as patriotism, and of course, poor standard of living together with constant oppression caused radicalism. Ideological standards had set a certain level of violence, which UÇK had capitalised on. Actions taken by the international actors after the Dayton Agreement, which had ended Bosnia and Herzegovina's struggle for independence during the earlier phase of the Yugoslavian Wars together with Croatia, furthered a sense of disillusionment among Albanians. The United Nations embargo imposed on Yugoslavia was lifted, and the European Union states officially recognised the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Bonn and Belgrade made an agreement and Germany returned 100,000 Albanian refugees to Yugoslavia, and 'it appeared as if the last international means to put pressure on Belgrade were also lost'. Thus, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK) concluded that the international community sent a message that 'Kosovo was definitely off the current international agenda', and this demoralised and weakened the non-violent movement in Kosovo which 'felt betrayed by the international community and began to doubt the effectiveness of its own tactics'.

The initial phase of the UÇK rebellion began in 1996. The first violent action allegedly taken by the UÇK was the killing of a Serbian policeman in 1995, but it was not until 1996 that an organisation calling itself the UÇK claimed responsibility for the attacks. The first ‘planned’ assaults, however, took place on 22 April 1996, when four almost simultaneous attacks were launched in separate locations that killed two policemen. After that, there were sporadic UÇK attacks on Serbian policemen, even though the intensity of rebellion remained quite low. It was on 15 October 1997 that the first UÇK man ‘in uniform’ died while attacking a police station at Klicina. While the number of attacks was increasing, the death toll remained fairly low during the period (Kubo, 2010).

Serbian authorities did not take their time to denounce the UÇK as a terrorist organisation. Although at first the international stage did so as well, their stance swiftly changed as the region turned into a warzone with thousands of casualties and humanitarian emergencies.

On the other side, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (AFRK/FARK) was an also existing armed group aligned with the LDK, originally rivalled with UÇK. During the time of the war, their difference may be ignored due to their cooperation.

3.5. Heat of the Battle

At the beginning of 1998, Kosovo was on the brink of open conflict. Despite international calls for restraint and dialogue, Serbian forces accelerated their repressive and counterinsurgency actions. In January 1998, Serbian special forces commenced exercises apparently aimed at intimidating the Kosovar Albanian population. At the same time, Serbian civilians were armed and paramilitary groups entered Kosovo from Serbia (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

On February 27, 1998, heavily armed Yugoslav forces attacked the Drenice/Drenica village of Likososhan/Likosane, using armoured units and helicopter gunships. Four Yugoslav policemen and an unknown number of Albanians were killed. The fighting continued for several days in the Drenice/Drenica area. In response, a street protest was organised in Pristina on March 2. Yugoslav forces violently broke up the protest with water cannons, tear gas and batons, injuring at least 289 people (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

Human Rights Watch (HRW) conducted an extensive investigation into the events surrounding the Drenica/Drenica violence and concluded that these events constituted a “turning point in the Kosovo crisis”. The report goes on to look at actions in several other villages, and it concludes that a wide range of civilians, including dozens of women and children, died in the conflict. In addition to killings, the report chronicles a range of other human rights violations committed by Serbian forces and authorities, including attacks and restrictions on humanitarian workers, arbitrary arrests and detentions, restrictions on the media, and forced disappearances. Some KLA (UÇK) abuses are also detailed, focusing predominantly on abductions. Reported KLA abuses concentrated on Serb, but also on occasion included Albanians who were deemed to be “collaborators” (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

The Yugoslav government continued to characterize the situation as an internal conflict that was under control. Following the four-day clear and sweep operation in Drenice/Drenica, the Serbian deputy chief of the Kosovo province, Veljko, announced: “The operation to liquidate the heart of Kosovo terrorism has ended.” Thereafter, Yugoslav officials bused reporters and officials into Kosovo to tour the villages where the operations had been conducted.

Meanwhile, the region remained sealed off and the estimated 5000 internally displaced people remained without food or medical deliveries (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

Nevertheless, the problem was now undeniably internationalised. The United States withdrew certain diplomatic concessions. The American press reported CIA warnings that the Yugoslav army was mobilising on the Kosovo border. On March 9, the Contact Group called for an arms embargo. On March 10, Louise Arbour, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), publicly asserted the Tribunal's jurisdiction over violations of international humanitarian law in Kosovo. On March 31 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1160 by a vote of 14-0, with People's Republic of China abstaining, imposing an arms embargo on Yugoslavia and calling for autonomy and "meaningful self-administration" for Kosovo. Yugoslavia's ambassador to the United Nations, Vladislav Jovanovic, decried the move stating: "There is not, nor has there been, any armed conflict in Kosovo. Hence, there is no danger of a spillover, there is no threat to peace and security." (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

The Drenice/Drenica violence and the police brutality against the peaceful student protests in Pristina had internal consequences as well. The KLA at this point had no political program, no accepted representation, no international recognition, and no control over military forces of any significance. But reports of massacres and myths of national martyrs suddenly made the KLA the driving force of national liberation in the eyes of a growing number of Kosovar Albanians. For the first time, the KLA could claim significant political power. As the number of Kosovar Albanians who looked to the KLA increased, support for the LDK party's non-violent parallel state strategy diminished (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000), as mentioned before.

4. International Attention

In the aftermath of the events in Drenice/Drenica, both sides of the conflict increased the depth and scope of their activities. This campaign was aimed not only at stopping the spread of KLA activities but intended to achieve this by directly targeting the Albanian majority civilian population in rural areas (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

Starting in April and continuing into the summer of 1999, increases in attacks on civilians were reported against all parties involved in the widening conflict. The Humanitarian Law Center (HLC) began registering an increased variety of abuses committed against Serbians, including disappearances, abduction, and arbitrary detentions. In a number of cases, KLA activities were directly linked to abuses, causing Serbian residents to flee their homes and villages (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

The increase in KLA abuses, while notable, was far outstripped by the rise in abuses perpetrated by FRY security and paramilitary forces. Extra-judicial executions, excessive use of force, and disappearances were frequent, and were described by Amnesty International as an established pattern. Specific, detailed reports of this type of abuse were collected. These increases in military activity and violence against civilians led to the first public consideration by the NATO Alliance of military intervention in June 1998. One senior NATO official is quoted as saying: "There is a new sense of urgency, and the focus of the debate is on air strikes." On June 10, 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated the need for military action if diplomacy were unable to end the crisis. According to the ICTY Deputy Prosecutor, Graham Blewitt, "There is an armed conflict taking place here." The Permanent Council of the OSCE issued Decision 218, authorizing the establishment of border monitoring stations along the Kosovo-Albania border, which became fully operational at the end of June 1998. Immediately upon their establishment, OSCE border monitors began reporting a substantial

level of military activity and fighting along the border. These reports caught the attention of high-level Western diplomats. In the second week of July, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel, made a visit to the area to get a first-hand briefing from the OSCE border monitors regarding the state of the conflict. From that point forward, the OSCE maintained an active presence on the border (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

4.1. Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM)

In another important monitoring development, the Yeltsin-Milosevic meeting in June opened the way for the installation in July of the United States Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), which attempted to unite the disparate fragments of the KLA. The KDOM office filled a vacuum: as one journalist put it, “finally there was a place where the KLA leadership could be contacted.” Several European countries and Russia also participated in the KDOM operation, and their respective embassies began a series of regular monitoring meetings in Belgrade (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

Throughout July and August, Serbian incursions into Albanian territory and air space were regular, as was the bombing and burning of villages in the Prizren region. KLA incursions into Kosovo were also frequent, and Serbian forces responded with a variety of tactics, including the use of landmines and ambushes. KLA casualties were sometimes substantial. Conflict was also taking place inwards, not just the border region (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

During this period, European diplomats referred to the destruction as an excessive use of military force. Responding to this summer long escalation, the president of the United Nations Security Council issued a statement at the end of August calling for an immediate cease-fire. On July 7, 1998, the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor had announced its preliminary

determination as to the existence of an “armed conflict.” Furthermore, the same press release stated ICTY’s intent to devote additional resources to the investigations.

On September 23, 1998, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1199, which cited Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and demanded a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces “used for civilian repression.” Three days later, on September 26, 1998, Yugoslav forces reportedly mortared the village of Obri e Eperme, killing at least 18 women, children, and elderly persons.

The FRY military campaign of the summer of 1998 in Kosovo was in many ways a success. The KLA had been effectively uprooted as a military force and proven unable to protect civilians in all contested areas. Yugoslav army units and officer corps conducted what at the beginning some believed to be an unconstitutional military campaign against its civilian population. The international response, in military terms, had been limited to air maneuvers over Albania and Macedonia (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

On October 13, 1998, however, NATO authorities voted to authorize air strikes if security forces were not withdrawn from Kosovo within 96 hours. After a period of intense negotiations, United States Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, representing the Contact Group, and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic reached an agreement, based on the demands in Resolution 1199, and obviously under the threat of the NATO activation order. While the agreement was never published, its major points addressed the reduction in forces and deployment of monitors. This agreement was submitted to the United Nations Security Council for approval. Milosevic agreed with negotiators to pull back security forces, allow access to aid groups, and accept the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (OSCE-KVM), a

team of 2000 civilian observers who would monitor the enforcement of the agreement. This monitoring effort would be completed by NATO overflights. Despite these positive developments, NATO authorities kept the activation order in place, permitting the NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, United States Army General Wesley Clark, to launch air strikes in the event of FRY non-compliance. (Ibid)

4.2. Holbrooke-Milosevic

On October 24, 1998, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1203, which affirmed the agreement between Contact Group negotiators and the Yugoslav government, providing for OSCE-KVM deployment and Yugoslav troops withdrawals. By the end of October, large numbers of Yugoslav forces had been withdrawn and KVM monitors deployed. Also on October 24, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1207, which called upon Yugoslav authorities to comply with the requests of the ICTY, including the arrest of certain individuals. At the beginning of October, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry had refused to acknowledge the ICTY's jurisdiction in Kosovo, claiming it to be an infringement of national sovereignty. Pursuant to this position, Yugoslav authorities had denied visas to ICTY investigators and threatened to cease cooperation with the ICTY Liaison Office in Belgrade. The Chief Prosecutor declared the Yugoslav actions to be "totally unacceptable." With Resolution 1207, the United Nations Security Council rejected the Yugoslav sovereignty argument and firmly established ICTY's investigative authority (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

The violence against the civilian population in Kosovo throughout 1998 was accompanied by a series of other systematic and institutional violations of civil rights by Serbian and FRY authorities, further establishing a hostile environment for the civilian population. The two

most notable violations were political trials that lacked due process, and efforts to suppress any free and independent media (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

Serbia initially implemented the agreement and withdrew its forces accordingly. The KLA, by contrast, took advantage of the new situation and renewed military action. In fact, KLA forces moved in to take up positions vacated by the redeployed Serbian forces. The United Nations as well as NATO and the OSCE were alarmed by the KLA's actions. NATO noted in a statement of December 8, that "both Belgrade authorities and the armed Kosovar elements have failed to comply fully with the requirements set out in Security Council Resolution 1160, 1199 and 1203. We call upon the armed Kosovar elements to cease and desist from provocative actions and we call upon the FRY and Serbian authorities to reduce the number and visibility of MUP special police in Kosovo and abstain from intimidating behaviour." (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

The situation worsened during and after December, as arms shipments conducted by the KLA were caught and ambushed by Serbian forces causing further casualties, followed by increasing border tensions. There were also reports conducted by the United Nations regarding that a certain number of detentions were made against the Albanians. It was becoming clear that, despite the initial success of the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement and the KVM presence in protecting civilians, KVM was no longer in a position to address necessary peacekeeping issues. From aerial monitoring over the region, NATO was aware of violations of the cease-fire agreement during this period (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

From that point onwards, Serbian military movement increased its pace. Serbian forces with tanks and heavy armour established permanent positions along the Macedonian border with

Kosovo. Assaults on villages were continuous, and the ICTY Chief Prosecutor was refused entry into Kosovo at the border with Macedonia on January 18, 1999 (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

4.3. Rambouillet Agreement

Following up on calls for dialogue, Contact Group members organised peace negotiations to be held in Rambouillet, France, commencing February 6. Serbian and Kosovar Albanian leaders were invited to attend, as were representatives of the FRY. The core of the Contact Group plan included the disarming of the KLA and the withdrawal of Serbian forces with supervision from an “enabling force” of 30,000 NATO troops. The plan provided for a restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy and its independent institutions but left the issue of future status for reconsideration after three years. In an unsuccessful attempt, the Contact Group was, in the end, unable to formulate a plan to which both FRY and Kosovar negotiators could agree. A second round of talks took place in Paris March 15-19. On March 18 the Kosovar Albanian delegation signed the proposal then on the table; the Serbian delegation did not. The negotiations failed (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

It is important to note that for the entire period of internal war, between February 1998 and March 1999, preceding the bombing campaign, the Commission has had considerable difficulty pinpointing statistics on the levels of lethal violence committed against civilians in Kosovo. A precise quantification of abuses, particularly killings, was difficult if not impossible to determine because detailed, verified data was not readily available (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

5. NATO Intervention

As late as March 22 and 23, United Nations Secretary-General Annan demanded that the Yugoslav armed forces immediately cease their offensive in Kosovo. On March 23, 1999, the NATO Secretary-General, Dr. Javier Solana, in a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General, outlined a series of incidents demonstrating a rapid decay of the situation in Kosovo. In particular, he noted the dramatic increase in FRY military activities following the pullout of OSCE-KVM. The NATO Secretary-General also warned of a humanitarian catastrophe resulting from the excessive force used by the FRY. On the same day, the Yugoslav government declared a state of emergency. On March 24, at 8pm local time, NATO aircraft started the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

President Clinton articulated the goals of the NATO campaign in his TV speech on March 24: to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's response to aggression, to deter Milosevic's escalating attacks in Kosovo, and seriously to damage Yugoslavia's military capacity to wage war in the future. The European leaders said about the same but stressed more strongly that the NATO intervention was necessary to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. Clinton also clarified that the United States government had no intention of deploying ground troops to fight a war. The other NATO governments took the same position. The underlying NATO assumption was that a relatively short bombing campaign would persuade Milosevic to come back to sign the Rambouillet agreement. NATO also underestimated the obvious risk that the Belgrade government in one way or another would reciprocate by attacking Kosovar Albanians. In spite of all the Western intelligence, there was no contingency planning for refugees (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

5.1. Operation Allied Force / Operation Noble Anvil (24 March - 10 June 1999)

The NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia was conducted between March 24, 1999 and June 10, 1999. NATO aircraft from 13 countries flew 38,400 sorties in the campaign, including 10,484 strike sorties in which 26,614 air munitions were released. The campaign was a complex, constantly evolving military operation. Decision-making throughout the campaign was influenced by micro-management and political judgment calls from several key NATO member governments. The need for consensus among all 19 members of the Alliance, including three new member states – Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary – and those, like Greece, with close historical ties to Serbia, put additional constraints on the military decision-making process. The political cohesion of the Alliance held throughout the campaign, despite serious debates and disagreements between members. The United States flew over 60% of all sorties, and over 80% of the strike sorties. It played an even more dominant role in carrying out high-tech aspects of the campaign (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

NATO began the bombing campaign, as has been pointed out, with the expectation that the Yugoslav government would propose a cease-fire and wish to renew negotiations after only a few days. Two other mistaken assumptions followed unavoidably from this erroneous starting point.

1. Since the bombing campaign was originally planned to last only several days and to include a limited number of military targets, NATO governments did not prepare their constituencies for the consequences of what was to become 78 days of intense conflict.

2. NATO erroneously assumed that a short bombing campaign would not lead to dramatic escalation in the displacement and expulsion of the Kosovar Albanian population (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

During the first days of the bombing runs, units struck military targets including air defence and communications installations. Although the bombing succeeded in putting the Yugoslavian air force out of operation, it did not succeed in destroying the air defences, even though they received serious damages by the end of the war. NATO pilots were ordered to fly at altitudes above 15,000 feet to avoid the constant threat of Yugoslavian air defence systems, which was a criticised decision as it limited pilots' ability to accurately establish the military nature of targets. The large quantity of decoy targets hit suggest that pilots were not able to make positive visual identification before attacking. According to a number of reports, the NATO attacks in Kosovo did relatively no damage to FRY ground forces. In spite of the bombing, the FRY military forces attacked the KLA rather successfully throughout Kosovo. It was also impossible for NATO forces to stop the expulsion and killings of civilian Albanians (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

After four weeks of bombing runs, the Yugoslavian leadership would still not respond to negotiation proposals. At the NATO summit in Washington on April 23, 1999, Alliance leaders decided upon further intensifying the air campaign by expanding the target set to include military-industrial infrastructure, media, and other targets in Serbia itself. 59 bridges (seven on the Danube), nine major highways (including Belgrade-Nis and Belgrade-Zagreb) and seven airports were destroyed. Most of the main telecommunication transmitters were damaged, two thirds of the main industrial plants were nearly destroyed. According to NATO, 70% of the electricity production capacity and 80% of the oil refinery capacity was knocked

out. Hitting these targets, however, had significant political fallout: the consequent suffering of the Serbian civilian population contradicted initial NATO assurances that the war was not aimed at the Serbian people (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

NATO made substantial efforts to avoid civilian casualties. In spite of these efforts, there were some serious mistakes. The bombing of the Chinese embassy on May 7, had a significant political impact and most likely encouraged Milosevic to wait and see if he could profit from the error. Another catastrophic mistake was the bombing of Korisa, with more than 80 Kosovars killed: There were a number of other instances during the NATO air campaign in which civilians were killed or injured by NATO bombs. These included two incidents on one day when many IDP convoys of internally displaced Kosovars were struck by NATO bombs, and another in which a passenger train was bombed (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

When the bombing campaign failed to bring Milosevic back to the table, NATO member states realised that had made some miscalculations. At the end of April, the question floating nervously around many NATO capitals was on how to end the war. As uncertainty mounted as to whether the bombing campaign could achieve the desired result, the German government promoted the first main diplomatic initiative in April. This plan insisted that the United Nations should be brought into the process and should have some role in the administration of Kosovo. Russia was a key factor. The Russians were adamantly opposed to the war but were also very interested in finding a diplomatic solution to end it. At the G8 meeting in Cologne, there was an agreement between Russia and the G7 countries on a seven-point peace plan that closely followed the original German initiative (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

In April, planning for a ground invasion began at NATO headquarters. Military planners, led by General Wesley Clark, warned politicians that for an invasion to begin in the first week of September, before the onset of winter, the orders to begin preparing would have to have been given in the first week of June. There was, however, strong political resistance against ground troops in several of the NATO countries, and certainly in United States. The discussion about ground troops was also aimed at increasing the pressure on Milosevic; it was understood from the start that ground troops were only a distant possibility, and that the necessary political consensus would be difficult to achieve (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

5.2. Kumanovo Agreement (9 June 1999)

A final round of negotiations completed in early June averted the need for a ground invasion. European Union envoy Martti Ahtisaari and Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin brought a proposal to Belgrade that based on G8 principles. These principles called for an immediate and verifiable end to the repression and violence in Kosovo; the withdrawal of FRY military, police, and paramilitary forces; the deployment of effective international civil and security presences; and the return of all refugees. While the plan stated that “the people of Kosovo will enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” no timeline or mechanism for resolving Kosovo’s long-term status was included in the agreement. On June 1, 1999, the Yugoslavian government advised the government of Germany that it would accept the G8 principles (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

On June 3, the Serbian Parliament formally approved a peace plan based on the G8 principles. After delays caused by difficulties working out a technical agreement, NATO suspended its air attacks on June 10. That same day, after confirming that FRY forces were withdrawing pursuant to the peace plan, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244,

which established the framework for United Nations civil administration of the province and the establishment of an international security presence (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

5.2.1. UNSC Resolution 1244: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (10 June 1999)

On the same day that NATO ceased its air campaign against Yugoslavia, June 10, 1999, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244. The resolution set out the basic guidelines that would regulate the international community's response to the postwar situation in Kosovo. Resolution 1244 provided for "the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences" and requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative to supervise the international civil presence and coordinate its activities with the operations of the military security presence under the overall command of NATO. It endorsed the establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo, directed the international civil presence to facilitate a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, called for the safe and free return home of all refugees and displaced persons, and demanded the demilitarisation of the KLA (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

The text of Resolution 1244 foreshadowed the "four pillars" on which the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) later came to rest its activities:

- Pillar I: Humanitarian affairs, led by the UNHCR;
- Pillar II: Civil administration under UNMIK itself;
- Pillar III: Democratisation and institution-building, led by the OSCE; and
- Pillar IV: Economic development, managed by the European Union.

5.2.2. Kosovo Force (KFOR) (11 June 1999)

The terms and objectives of the deployment of an international military presence were set out in the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) between the Kosovo International Security Force (KFOR) and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, signed on June 9. On June 10, 1999, following the adoption of Resolution 1244, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) authorized the deployment of KFOR troops, designating the action “Operation Joint Guardian.”

The MTA, which took immediate effect upon signing, contains two annexes. The first delineated the gradual withdrawal of the Yugoslavian military, paramilitary, and security forces. Yugoslavian forces were given 11 days to withdraw completely from Kosovo’s three zones demarcated in the first annex, though only three days were afforded to secure the withdrawal of Yugoslavian air and air defence forces. The second annex defined the mandate for KFOR operations in Kosovo. This mandate was then slightly amended in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, which called on KFOR to:

- Establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission;
- Contribute to a secure environment for the international civil implementation presence, and other international organisations, agencies, and non-governmental organisations;
- Provide appropriate control of the borders of FRY in Kosovo with Albania and Macedonia until the arrival of civilian mission of the United Nations.

Although in theory Resolution 1244 allows any United Nations member state to station troops in Kosovo, in practice it was assumed that KFOR would be the only international force present (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

During the first phase of Operation Joint Guarding, NATO troops moved into Kosovo and set up KFOR headquarters in Pristina. To facilitate peacekeeping, KFOR divided the area into five zones, each under the control of a different NATO member state. The north, in the region of Mitrovica, was placed under the control of France, which contributed 7,000 troops to the operation. The south, in the region of Prizren, was to be Germany's responsibility with 8,000 troops allocated. The region of Peje/Pec, in the west, was placed under the control of Italy with 6,000 units stationed. Finally, the central area around Pristina and the eastern region around Gjilan/Gnjilane were to be the responsibility of the United Kingdom and the United States, with 8,000 and 6,000 forces, respectively. KFOR peacekeeping units advancing into Kosovo from Macedonia and Albania met with negligible Serbian resistance, consisting of only a few isolated encounters with Serbian security units. Yugoslavian military and paramilitary forces withdrew from Kosovo within the time period stipulated in the MTA (Kosovo, I. I. C. O., 2000).

6. Conclusion & Issues to be Addressed

Kosovo still holds its position as one of the most fragile regions in Europe and requires continuous attention. Although UNMIK has done remarkable work, there is still much progress to be made. However, it is up to the respective offices and organisations to uphold the task of rebuilding the nation and its society, while NATO's duty is to ensure peace, security and stability. It is up to the committee to deal with and answer these issues/questions:

1. What is the most balanced approach in terms of ethics and efficiency towards hostilities in the Kosovo region?
2. What is the most correct method to counter any kind of violent action taken by either side?

3. How should the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation maximize the effectiveness of available resources, during and after the conflict?
4. How should the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation handle a post-war/conflict situation in Kosovo?
5. How should post-war Federal Republic of Yugoslavia be treated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, for a scenario resulting in either an alliance victory or defeat?
6. How should the distribution of duty and responsibility of each member state be handled within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation regarding the conclusion of the Kosovo War?
7. Which economic measures can be taken either as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or through the encouragement of the latter during and after the Kosovo Crisis?
8. With which organisations should the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation co-operate with in order to take care of any refugee/forced displacement issue related to the Kosovo War?
9. With which organisations and publications should the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation co-operate with in order to ensure transparency with their operations, for the international community/media?
10. What would be the most ideal method to utilise the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union in the region?
11. Under which conditions and how should post-war security and stability be achieved through the authority of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation?

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